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 1 Introduction
It is common to model the setting of indirect taxes as a problem of maximizing
a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function under the constraint of generating
some level of ﬁscal revenue for the government.1 This approach has contributed in
part to the development of a theory of optimal indirect taxation. One of the theory’s
basic ingredients is a socially-weighted cost-beneﬁt ratio. This ratio involves eco-
nomic efﬁciency considerations as well as distributional value judgements. Eco-
nomic efﬁciency considerations take into account the ﬁscal impact of the behav-
ioral reactions to changes in indirect taxes; distributional judgements weigh the
gains and the losses of individuals that differ often markedly in living standards,
preferences and socio-demographic characteristics.
The recent social welfare literature has often focussed on the well-being of the
population of the poor2, which leads to the problem of minimizing a poverty index
subject to some ﬁscal revenue constraint for the government. In many developing
countries, income transfer schemes for the poor are usually constrained by the lack
of information that government agencies have on the distribution of well-being.
This makes a system of negative indirect taxation – or subsidies – a predominant
tool for social welfare policy in these countries. The problem of how to improve
the design of indirect taxes and subsidies so as to meet both poverty and efﬁciency
criteria then becomes an important element of poverty alleviation strategies3.
It is well-known, however, that the measurement of poverty is to a large extent
arbitrary. Measuring and comparing poverty require choosing selectively among
a very large number of available poverty indices. It also involves using some ar-
bitrary ofﬁcial or semi-ofﬁcial poverty line, or estimating some other non-ofﬁcial
line through procedures that are typically sensitive to many crucial ethical and sta-
tistical assumptions. Hence, it is not surprising that designing indirect taxation on
the basis of such poverty assessment may also be considered arbitrary4. The pa-
per’s main objective is to illustrate how it may be possible to curb such degrees of
arbitrariness by searching for tax reforms that are necessarily poverty reducing for
a range of poverty lines and for classes of poverty indices of some ethical order.
To do this, the paper follows closely the social efﬁciency approach recently
developed by Bibi (2001) and Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2002). Unlike Duc-
1See, among many others, Diamond (1975), Ahmad and Stern (1984, 1991), Baccouche and
Laisney (1986), and Deaton and Grimard (1992).
2See, for instance, Blackorby and Donaldson (1980) and Atkinson (1987) for a discussion of the
use of poverty measures as social utility functions.
3This issue for Tunisia is partly summarized in World Bank (1996): ”The Tunisian Government
was then faced with a common policy dilemma in reforming its subsidy program: how to reduce
budgetary costs, in a politically acceptable way, while protecting low income groups.”
4On this, see for instance Bibi (1998)
2los et al. (2002), we use demand elasticity estimates to assess the marginal eco-
nomic efﬁciency of various sources of tax revenues. We are therefore able to iden-
tify truly poverty-decreasing tax reforms. Unlike Bibi’s (2001) approach, which
is conditioned on the choice of a predetermined poverty measure, we search for
poverty-reducing reforms over classes of poverty aggregation procedures. The pa-
per also builds on the important contributions of Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991),
Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995), and Yitzhaki and Lewis (1996). However, unlike
these papers, which focus on second-order welfare improving tax reforms, this one
censors well-being at (varying) poverty lines and also considers poverty-reducing
tax reforms for various orders of ethical principles. Applying the methodology to
Tunisian data, we ﬁnd that poverty could be robustly reduced at constant ﬁscal rev-
enue by increasing subsidy rate on hard wheat and mixed oils and lowering subsidy
on sugar and milk.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section (2) links poverty alle-
viation and indirect taxation. Section (3) describes how to check for the ethical
robustness of the impact of indirect tax reforms on poverty. Section (4) applies the
methodology using a Tunisian household budget survey, and Section (5) concludes
the paper.
2 Poverty and indirect taxation
Let p and t be K-vectors of consumer prices and tax rates, respectively. For sim-
plicity, we take producer prices to be invariant to changes in t and we normalize
them to 1. We therefore have pk = 1 + tk and dpk = dtk, where pk and tk are
respectively commodity k’s consumer price and indirect tax rate. A good k is sub-
sidized when tk < 0. Let x(y;!;p) be a vector of K quantities of commodities
purchased by a consumer facing prices p and having an exogenous income y and
some preferences !.
Since we wish to assess the poverty effects of marginal price changes and
marginal tax reforms, we must use a consumer’s indicator of well-being that is
sensitive to changes in prices and tax rates. A useful formulation is King’s (1983)
equivalent income function, ye (y;!;pr;p), which is deﬁned implicitly by:
v(ye (y;!;pr;p);!;pr) ´ v(y;!;p); (1)
where v(¢) is the consumer’s indirect utility function, pr is a vector of reference
prices, and ye is the expenditure which yields the same utility level under pr as
y provides under p. Notice that ye is an exact monetary metric of actual utility
since it is an increasing monotonic transformation of v(y;!;p). ye can also be
3usefully interpreted as a real expenditure function deﬁned in reference to the prices
pr. Inverting (1) yields ye (y;!;pr;p).
To describe how poverty is affected by changes in t, we must also obviously
address the measurement of poverty. Sen’s (1976) inﬂuential work has generated a
considerable literature on this5. We start with the popular Foster-Greer-Thorbecke
(1984) (FGT) class of poverty indices, although an important aim of this paper is
rather to show how the use of these peculiar indices is also useful for predicting
how many other indices will react to tax changes. Let z be a real poverty line, that











where f+ = max(0;f) and where F(ye) is the distribution of real or equivalent
income ye.7 ® is a parameter that captures the ”aversion to poverty” or the dis-
tribution sensitivity of the index8. The FGT indices are averages of powers of
normalized poverty gaps, (z ¡ y)+=z. As is well known, P0(z) is the poverty
headcount (the ”incidence” of poverty), P1(z) is the normalized average poverty
gap measure (the ”intensity” of poverty), and P2(z) is often described as an index
of the ”severity” of poverty – it weights poverty gaps by poverty gaps. For ® > 1,
P®(z) is sensitive to the distribution of living standards among the poor, and when
® becomes very large, P®(z) approaches a Rawlsian measure.9







where xk(y;p) denotes the expected consumption10 of commodity k at income y,
and where F(y) is the distribution of nominal expenditures. As mentioned above,
we constrain R(t) to remain unaffected by our tax reforms: these reforms are thus
revenue-neutral. The optimal design of an indirect tax system may then be formally
5For recent surveys of the literature on the axiomatic foundations and the design of poverty in-
dices, see, for instance, Zheng (1997, 2000).
6In terms of (1), if vz is the minimal level of utility required to live a decent live, then
v(z;!;p
r) ´ vz for all !.
7The use of equivalent incomes in the FGT measures can also be found, for instance, in Besley
and Kanbur (1988) and in Ravallion and van de Walle (1991).




Ω xk(y;!;p)dF(! jy), with F(! jy) being the conditional distribution of prefer-
ences and Ω the set of all possible preferences.
4described by the solution to the problem of minimizing a poverty index subject to
constant overall indirect tax revenues.
We are not, however, interested in identifying the optimal tax system, which
would necessarily depend on the nature of the poverty index and poverty line cho-
sen. Rather, we seek tax reform directions that will decrease poverty for a wide
class of poverty indices and poverty lines. The search for such directions will
nevertheless be guided by the ﬁrst-order derivatives of both P®(z) and R(t) with
respect to tk.
To see this, let xk(p) be the per capita consumption of good k, Ek be the
marginal efﬁciency cost of funds (MECF) from taxing good k 11, and Dk
®(z) be the














®(z) can also be interpreted as a Feldstein’s (1972) distributional char-
acteristic of commodity k. The product of these two quantities gives ¸k
®(z), the
poverty cost per marginal dollar of tax raised from increasing tk:
¸k





The larger the value of Dk
®(z), the greater the distributive cost of a tk increase. The
larger the value of Ek, the lower the revenue effectiveness of the tax change since
the lower its impact on government revenue. Therefore, the larger the value of
Ek, the larger the economic efﬁciency cost of a tax increase. ¸k
®(z) is an intuitive
product of the distributive and of the efﬁciency costs of the tax change: it is the
povertycostofraisingamarginaldollarofgovernmentrevenuethroughanincrease
in tk. Note that if Ek is negative, we are on a downward-sloping area of the Laffer
curve and it is always necessarily better to reduce tk.
Given this interpretation, it is not surprising that ¸k
®(z) plays a useful role
in identifying poverty-reducing tax reforms. Indeed, what matters for designing
poverty-alleviating revenue-neutral policy reforms are the comparative values of
the ¸k
®(z) for different k. When ¸
j
®(z) < ¸l
®(z), poverty (as measured by P®(z))
can be dropped by raising one more dollar from tj and one less dollar from tl (thus
keeping overall government revenue constant).
11See Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995), Bibi (2001), and Duclos et al. (2002) for a discussion of this.
5Let xk(y;p) be consumption of k relative to average consumption, that is,
xk(y;p) = xk(y;p)=xk(p). Using Roy’s identity and setting reference prices to




xk(z;p)f(z) if ® = 0;
®z¡® R 1
0 xk(y;p)(z ¡ y)
®¡1
+ dF(y) if ® > 0;
(7)
where f(z) is the density of income at z. The interpretation of (7) depends on
whether ® is positive or equal to zero:
² With ® = 0, the poverty objective of a tax reform is to reduce the propor-
tion of the population in poverty. Because the tax reforms we consider are
marginal, it is only those at the margin of poverty that can be brought in or
out of poverty by such a tax reform. It is therefore only the consumption pro-
ﬁle x(z;p) of those at or just around z that matters in identifying headcount-
reducing directions for marginal tax reforms. Seeking to reduce P0(z) could
then lead to a reform that beneﬁts more the richest of the poor but penalizes
the poorest of them – an example of an r-type ﬁscal reform in Bourguignon
and Fields’s (1997) terminology. This could occur if the consumption pro-
ﬁle of those close to z differs signiﬁcantly from the consumption proﬁle of
poorer individuals.
² With ® > 0, every poor person’s consumption counts, but not necessarily
equally. The weights on the consumption xj(y;p) are proportional to the
poverty gaps (z ¡ y)
®¡1
+ . Ceteris paribus, the larger the value of ®, the
more socially costly it is to increase the tax rate on a commodity consumed
mainly by the poorer. When a commodity is not consumed by the poor, there















and using (6), a poverty-decreasingand revenue-neutral marginaltax reform is then
described by a vector (±1;:::;±K) of marginal tax revenues ±k = @R(t)=@tk ¢ dtk









k=1 ±k = 0:
(10)
Once the ¸k
®(z) are estimated using (4), (5), (6) and (7), it is relatively straightfor-
ward to ﬁnd out if there exists a vector of ±k that can satisfy (10).
3 Robustness analysis
The above analysis clearly depends on the choice of a poverty index and of a
poverty line. Since both of these choices are typically somewhat arbitrary, so will
be the reform directions identiﬁed using them. We also saw that seeking reform
directions on the basis of reducing one poverty index can lead to policies that pe-
nalize the poorest of the poor, and can thus raise important ethical issues.
Fortunately, it is often possible to curb such degrees of arbitrariness and in-
equity by searching for tax reforms that are necessarily poverty reducing for a
range of z and for a class of ”acceptable” poverty indices. Such reforms may then
be called poverty improving, in analogy to the references to Pareto-improving tax
reforms in welfare economics. The acceptability of poverty indices will depend on
whether they meet normative criteria of some ethical order. Each order of norma-
tive criteria deﬁnes a class of poverty measures. As the ethical order increases, the
criteria put increasingly strong constraints on how poverty indices should rank dis-
tributions of living standards. Hence, we seek ﬁscal reforms that decrease poverty
over a range of z and for various orders of ethical criteria for measuring poverty.
To see how to do this, consider the following general utilitarian formulation of







where the ¼(y;!;z) are the individual contributions to poverty14. A class Πs(z¤)
of poverty evaluation functions (of ethical order s) can then be deﬁned by putting
restrictions on the properties of ¼(y;!;z) and by imposing that z · z¤. A ﬁrst nat-
ural normative property would seem to be that ¼(y;!;z) be weakly decreasing in
13For expositional simplicity, we thus focus on additive poverty poverty indices. See inter alia
Foster and Shorrocks (1988) for how non-additive evaluation functions could also be included in the
analysis.
14A poverty evaluation function can be thought of as the negative of a social evaluation function
censored at z – see Atkinson (1987) for instance.
7y, whatever the level of y and whatever the value of !. Because the ethical condi-
tion imposed for membership in that class is very weak – and is almost universally
accepted15 – we can consider that class to be of ethical order 0, and it can therefore
be denoted as Π0(z¤).
More formally, assume that ¼(y;!;z) is differentiable16 with respect to y for
all y < z, and denote by ¼(s)(y;!;z) the s-order derivative of ¼(y;!;z) with
















The ﬁrst line on the right of (12) deﬁnes the range of poverty lines that can be
chosen to measure poverty. The second line on the right of (12) assumes that
the poverty measures fulﬁll the well-known ”poverty focus axiom” – which states
that changes in the living standards of the non-poor should not affect the poverty
measure. The last line assumes that the Π0(z¤) indices are weakly decreasing in
income. For a marginal reform not to increase any of the poverty functions that are
members of Π0(z¤), it is then clear that it must not harm anyone whose income is
at or below z¤ – that is, it must be Pareto improving over that range of incomes.
The usual Pareto criterion obtains when a tax reform must not increase any of the
poverty indices that are members of Π0(1).
It has, however, long been recognized that searches for Pareto-improving tax
reforms are generally doomed to failure, especially in a world of heterogenous
preferences. For a tax reform to be Pareto improving, it must indeed not decrease
anyone’sliving standard, whatever one’sconsumption preferences. This is unlikely
to be possible, even if we constrain the relevant living standards to be below some
z¤. The use of the Pareto criterion thus essentially gives a veto status to the status
quo, whatever those existing tax systems may be. Because of this, a number of
earlier studies have opted for imposing a particular form on the social evaluation
functions and/or on the social weights on the well-being of individuals.17
The alternative route followed here is to design social-improvement criteria
that are of ”higher” ethical order than the Pareto criterion. It would seem, for in-
stance, that a plausible ethical judgement of higher order than the Pareto judgement
would require that the social contributions ¼(y;!;z) in (11) should not depend on
15A focus on relative poverty might seem to provide an exception to this, since an increase in a
poor’s living standard could then increase the relative poverty line and possibly also increase the
poverty index. But note that z is kept constant in the present discussion of the ethical criteria.
16This differentiability assumption is made for expositional simplicity and could be relaxed.
17See for instance King (1983), Ahmad and Stern (1991), and Deaton and Grimard (1992), which
use a social weight that is smoothly decreasing in income.
8the taste parameters !, viz, we should have that ¼(y;!;z) = ¼(y;z) whatever
the value of !. The social judgement is then anonymous in the !, and (11) can
be rewritten as
R 1
0 ¼(y;z)dF(y). Maintaining the earlier 0-order ethical assump-







¼(y;!;z) = ¼(y;z) whenever y · z:
¾
(13)
Duclos et al. (2002) describes a tax reform that decreases poverty for all
poverty indices within Π1(1) as a Pen-improving tax reform18. Here, we are
more concerned in a sense with restricted Pen-improving tax reforms, that is, with
tax reforms that are Pen-improving over a [0;z¤] range of living standards. Equiva-
lently, these reforms can be described as ﬁrst-order poverty-improving tax reforms.
The results of Duclos et al. (2002) (see in particular their Theorem 1) can then be
used to show that:
Theorem 1 A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a marginal tax reform (de-
scribed by the vector of marginal tax revenues ±k) to be revenue neutral and
ﬁrst-order poverty-improving – that is, to decrease poverty weakly for all P(z) 2
Π1(z¤) – is that
PK
k=1 ¸k
0(z)±k · 0 for all z 2 [0;z¤]
and PK
k=1 ±k = 0:
(14)
If a tax reform is found not to satisfy (14), then its poverty impact is necessarily
ambiguous. Some of the P(z) in Π1(z¤) will declare the reform to worsen poverty,
while others will indicate that the reform will reduce poverty. To resolve this ambi-
guity, and in general to facilitate the search for poverty-improving tax reforms, two
avenues can be followed. The ﬁrst is to reduce the size of the set of the potentially
poor individuals by lowering z¤. The effect of this is not necessarily desirable if
one does not wish to constrain too much the range of poverty lines that are ad-
missible for making poverty comparisons. The second avenue is to search for tax
reforms that are poverty improving over a higher-order class of poverty indices. As
before, increasing the normative order of poverty indices is done by constraining
poverty indices to fulﬁll additional ethical criteria.
To follow this second avenue, assume that poverty indices must fall weakly
following a mean-preserving redistributive transfer from a richer to a poorer in-
dividual. This corresponds to imposing the well-known Pigou-Dalton criterion
18See Pen (1971). Bibi (2001) deﬁnes the Pen-improving tax reform as a reform which lessens the
headcount ratio, regardless of the poverty line chosen.
9on poverty indices, and thus to make the poverty analysis ”distribution sensitive”.

















where the last line of (15) is a continuity condition that excludes indices that are
discontinuous at the poverty line (like the headcount index).
The third-order class of poverty indices is analogously obtained by requiring
that, for a given distance between recipients and donors, the poverty-reducing ef-
fect of equalizing transfers be decreasing in the income of the recipient. To see this
more formally, let yr < z and yd be respectively the income of the recipient and of
the donor in a Pigou-Dalton redistributive transfer of size ¿, with yd¡yr > ¿ > 0.
Then, for a given value of ¿, P(z) must fall with yr if P(z) belongs to Π3(z¤).
Assuming differentiability again, this condition can be expressed by the sign of the
















¼(3)(y;z) being negative, the magnitude of ¼(2)(y;z) falls with y, and Pigou-
Dalton transfers lose their poverty-reduction effectiveness as recipients become
more afﬂuent.
This process can be continued iteratively up to any desired ethical order s by
putting appropriate restrictions on all derivatives up to ¼(s)(y;z). The ethically-
consistent sign of a derivative ¼(r)(y;z) is given by the sign of (¡1)r. We can then
use the results of Duclos et al. (2002) to show:
Theorem 2 A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a marginal tax reform (de-
scribedbythevectorofmarginaltaxrevenues±k)toberevenueneutralands-order
poverty-improving – that is, to decrease poverty weakly for all P(z) 2 Πs(z¤) – is
that PK
k=1 ¸k
s¡1(z)±k · 0 for all z 2 [0;z¤]
and PK
k=1 ±k = 0:
(17)
One way to check the existence of poverty-improving tax reforms is simply to
plot the different ¸k
s(z) over the range of poverty lines z 2 [0;z¤]. If the ¸k
s(z)
curves do not intersect for two k = j;l, then a marginal tax reform involving good
10j andl caneasilybeconstructedsuchastodecreaseallofthepovertymeasuresthat
belong to Πs(z¤). Note that this allows for the choice of any poverty line within
[0;z¤]. Π1(z¤) includes basically all of the poverty indices that have been proposed
(with the notable exceptions of the Sen (1976), Takayama (1979) and Kakwani
(1980) indices) and that are in use. Π2(z¤) includes all of those in Π1(z¤) with the
important exception of the headcount. Π3(z¤) further excludes indices such as the
linear indices of Hagenaars (1987) and Duclos and Gr´ egoire (2002).
To illustrate how the assessment of ﬁrst-order poverty-improving tax reforms
differs from that of second-order ones, assume that there are only two levels at
which incomes are grouped, y1 and y2, with y1 < y2 < z¤. For a tax reform
to be ﬁrst-order improving, it should increase (on average) the living standard of
each of these groups. This is, in a sense, equivalent to giving a veto to each group
taken as an average. By contrast, using Theorem 2 and equation (10), a second-
order improving tax reform will need to improve on average the poorest group’s
living standard as well as the overall mean living standard – but not necessarily the
average living standard of the second group. This eliminates the second group’s
veto power. The reform could thus be second-order improving even if everyone in
the richest group were to lose from it, providing that the gains of the poorest group
were high enough.
4 Application to Tunisia
4.1 Estimation of a demand system
Implementing the methodology presented above requires information on the joint
distributionofincomesandcommodityconsumption. Thisisreadilyobtainedfrom
household budget surveys. To search for ﬁrst-order poverty-improving tax reforms,
we further need estimates of the average commodity basket of those at or around
the poverty line. We do this non parametrically using simple kernel estimation
– see for instance H¨ ardle (1990) and Silverman (1986). Implementation of the
above methodology ﬁnally requires estimates of how commodity demands change
in response to price variations in order to assess the expected impact of tax reforms
on government revenue.
To make our estimates of aggregate demand behavior as ﬂexible and as consis-
tent as possible with disaggregated household behavior, we estimate the following
demand system:
wj(y;p) = %j +
PK
k=1 µjk lnpk + °j lny + ¹j(lny)2 + Àj;
with PK






k=1 ¹k = 0;
(18)
11and where wj(y;p) is the budget share of commodity j at y and Àj is a residual
term. Equation (18) looks very much like the ”Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand
System” (henceforth QAIDS) of Banks et al. (1997) in which budget shares are
linear in µjk;°j, and ¹j. The estimation strategy follows Deaton (1988, 1990) and
relies on the spatial variability of prices in Tunisia to estimate the price parameters
µjk in (18).
The model described by equation (18) was used to estimate a demand system
of ﬁfteen food commodities. For this, we use the 1990 Tunisian household sur-
vey which provides information on expenditures and quantities for food items and
expenditures for non-food items, as well as on many other dimensions of 7734
households’ behavior, education, housing, region of residence, demographic infor-
mation, and economic activities. The detailed procedure and results of the estima-
tion can be found in Bibi (2001). Table 1 in the appendix lists the ﬁfteen goods,
together with their own- and cross-price elasticities. The most estimated own-price
elasticities are, as they should be, negative and statistically signiﬁcant. The cross-
elasticity signs conﬁrm the intuitive substitutability between the various groups of
food goods, such as the Cereals, Olive and Mixed-Oils groups, and between the
different protein products such as the Meat, Fish and Poultry and Eggs groups.
We can use the results of Table 1 to predict the effects of tax reforms on gov-
ernment revenue. To do this, note that expected government revenue raised from
















(1 + tj)2 +
tjyµjj




































12Let wj(y;p) be the budget share of j relative to the aggregate budget share,




wj(z;p)zf(z) if ® = 0;
®z¡® R 1
0 wj(y;p)(z ¡ y)
®¡1
+ ydF(y) if ® > 0:
(23)






























where ekj is the cross-price elasticity of the commodity k relative to the price of
the commodity j. The denominator (which is 1=Ej =
@R(t)=@tj
xj(p) ) captures the
marginal rise of tax revenue from increasing tj. The second term of this denomi-
nator is the tax rate multiplied by the own-price elasticity. This gives an estimate
of the own-price distortionary effect of tj. If it is negative and large enough, as
would be the case for heavily taxed elastic commodities, it contributes to a high
value of ¸j. As a result, this commodity would be a costly candidate to increase
ﬁscal revenue. The last factor in the denominator, that is, the sum of the tax rates
multiplied by the cross-price elasticities, informs on the distortion resulting from
the cross effects of the tj variation on the other commodities. When taxes on all
commodities are low, Ej approximates 1, and efﬁciency consideration then do not
matter in searching for poverty-reducing ﬁscal reforms – only Feldstein’s (1972)
distributional characteristic are then important to consider.
4.2 Data and results
We focus our tax reform analysis on six commodities: hard wheat, tender wheat,
mixedoils, othersubsidized goods(poultry, eggs, milkandsugar), non-taxedgoods
(vegetables, fruit, meat, olive oils, and ﬁsh), and taxed goods (sweet foods, canned
foods, otherfoodcommodities, andnon-foodcommodities). Aper-adult-equivalent
povertylineofze = 335TunisianDinars(TD)peryearisusedasareferenceline19.
This line corresponds to approximately 50% of mean total expenditure.
Table 2 reports the economic efﬁciency cost of raising tax on each of these
commodities, Ek. Recall that this is the marginal economic efﬁciency cost of
19In 1990, 1 TD was worth approximately 1 US dollar.
13public funds, and that it also equals 1 plus the marginal deadweight loss of one
additional unit of tax revenue. Table 2 also shows the distributive cost Dk
®(z) and
the overall poverty cost ¸k
®(z) per TD of marginal tax revenue raised from taxation
of the different commodities.
Two groups of commodities clearly strike out of Table 2. The ﬁrst group in-
cludes tender wheat, hard wheat, and mixed oils. The second regroups the other
subsidized goods, non-taxed goods, and taxed goods. Commodities of the ﬁrst
group are a good target for tax decreases (or subsidy rises) as they show the high-
est distributive cost and economic efﬁciency. The reverse is true for commodities
of the second group: they are a good target for tax rises or subsidy falls. A fall
in the taxation of anyone of the commodities of the ﬁrst group combined with a
revenue-neutral rise in the taxation of any of the commodities of the second group
would be poverty decreasing.
Note that the ranking of commodities in terms of economic, distributive and
overall poverty cost is the same regardless of the choice of ®. The poverty cost of
marginal tax revenues is highest for mixed oils and lowest for taxed goods. Hence,
the largest poverty decrease per TD of reallocated government budget would be
obtained from increasing the subsidies on mixed oils while further increasing the
tax on the taxed goods.
Whether these poverty-decreasing reforms are robust to the choice of poverty
lines and indices depends on whether the ordering of the ¸k
®(z) is sensitive to the
choice of the poverty line ze. Figure 1 displays the estimates of the ¸k
0(z) in order
to search for ﬁrst-order poverty-improving tax reforms. Many of the ¸k
0(z) curves
do intersect. Restricting the upper limit for poverty lines to 900 TD20, we ﬁnd that
a tax rise on any one of the second group of commodities to ﬁnance a subsidy rise
on any one of the ﬁrst group of commodities is poverty improving. Figure 2 also
showsthatsuchdirectionsforreformaresecond-orderpovertyimprovingwhatever
the upper bound for poverty lines, and thus that they are Dalton improving in the
social welfare terminology of Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995). So there is no need to
test at a higher ethical order for such tax reforms in Tunisia.
It is perhaps instructive to point out that many studies have indeed suggested
reductions in the subsidy rates on tender wheat and on commodities within the
other subsidized goods in order to increase subsidy rates on hard wheat and mixed




®(z) among the ﬁrst set of commodities remains unchanged. As reported in the
2077.5% of the Tunisian population have their total annual expenditures below that bound.
21See, for instance, Newbery (1995) and Tuck and Lindert (1996).
14table, increasing the rate of subsidy on mixed oils is ﬁrst-order poverty improving
so long as the poverty lines do not exceed 275 TD.22 The reform is second-order
improving for all poverty lines up to 450 TD. Since it is difﬁcult to rule out all
poverty lines above 190 TD, decreasing subsidies on tender wheat in order to in-
crease them on hard wheat cannot be safely declared ﬁrst-order poverty improving,
although it seems safe to see such a reform as higher-order poverty improving.
Policymakers and policy analysts often look for tax reform directions that im-
prove the well-being of a majority of citizens. It is thus interesting to display
graphically the cumulative percentage of gainers from two hypothetical scenarios
of (restricted) Pen-improving reforms. Scenario 1 (2) suggests reductions in the
subsidy rate on tender wheat (on commodities within the other subsidized goods)
in order to increase subsidy rate on mixed oils. Figure 3 shows that scenario 1
could be politically difﬁcult to implement since the proportion of winners never
reaches 50 percent of the population. However, in addition to be a Pen-improving
tax reform, scenario 2 would also be popular since it would meet the approval of
more than 70 percent of the population.
5 Conclusion
This paper relates indirect taxation policy to poverty alleviation. The approach
extends the framework of Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995) to any degree of ethical
dominance and allows the analyst to censor welfare at a given poverty line so that
the emphasis is made on poverty alleviation rather than social welfare improve-
ment. The method can be used to test the extent to which tax reforms can be used
to decrease poverty, for large classes of poverty indices and for ranges of possible
poverty lines.
The empirical illustration is made using household survey from Tunisia. It
tests inter alia the claim of many earlier studies that reducing the rate of subsidy on
tender wheat and increasing that on hard wheat and mixed oils would improved the
targeting of Tunisia’s food subsidy system and help alleviate poverty. This paper’s
framework indicates that such a reform would not be conﬁdently ﬁrst-order poverty
improving, but would be (second-order) poverty reducing if we forced our poverty
analysis to be distribution sensitive.
22The ”ofﬁcial” poverty lines estimated by l’Institut National de la Statistique and the World Bank
are 218 TD per person per year for the urban areas and 185 TD for the rural areas. See World Bank
(1995) on this.
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where F(y) is the distribution of nominal income and ye (y;pr;p) is equivalent
income (abstracting for simplicity from dependence on preferences). For ® 6= 0,






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Table 2: Searching for poverty-decreasing tax reforms (ze = 335 TD)




Commodities Ek ® = 0 ® = 1 ® = 2 ® = 0 ® = 1 ® = 2
Tender wheat 0.72 1.03 0.93 0.86 0.74 0.67 0.62
Hard wheat 0.43 1.48 1.74 1.87 0.64 0.75 0.81
Mixed oils 0.66 1.28 1.43 1.53 0.84 0.94 1.02
Other sub. goods 0.24 0.83 0.73 0.67 0.20 0.17 0.16
Non-taxed goods 0.23 0.82 0.70 0.63 0.19 0.16 0.14
Taxed goods 0.22 0.56 0.47 0.43 0.16 0.14 0.12
Table 3: Maximal poverty lines for robust tax reforms (Values between parentheses
show the change in the ordinal rank of the curves ¸k
®(z) at the indicated poverty
line.)
® = 0 ® = 1 ® = 2 ® = 3
Mixed oils 275 450 600 700
(1 ¡! 2) (1 ¡! 2) (1 ¡! 2) (1 ¡! 2)
Hard wheat 190 300 390 450
(2 ¡! 3) (2 ¡! 3) (2 ¡! 3) (2 ¡! 3)
Tender Wheat 190 300 390 450
(3 ¡! 2) (3 ¡! 2) (3 ¡! 2) (3 ¡! 2)
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